Why Has the Global Plastic Pollution Treaty Failed, and What Role Should Indonesia Play?
Indonesia as a Bridge Between Competing Blocs
Plastic treaties have failed to produce effective outcomes. I argue that the failure to produce effective agreements stems from an unequal distribution of costs and benefits, divergence over regulatory scope, and differing views of treaty design among participating members.
Side-payments are regarded as indispensable for compliance and participation. Yet, its effectiveness is limited by the commitments of donor states (Howes et al. 2026:240). Reliance on side-payments alone will then fail if the distribution of benefits and costs is unequal.
The victim pays principle (VPP) has been among the most effective in incentivizing effective treaties. The North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty and the Montreal Protocol illustrate that the willingness to compensate polluters is not entirely dependent on economic gains but is influenced by other factors, such as health risk and resource conservation (Howes et al. 2026:254).
These cases also show that willingness to provide compensation is attributed to a growing domestic concern, influenced by demographic characteristics and resource availability. The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement also illustrates the fragility of side-payments and VPP to sustain treaty stability (The White House 2017).
Side-payments then risk becoming a short-term political initiative rather than a prolonged commitment. A plastic treaty would face the same landscape, for its durability depends on the support of powerful states.
Furthermore, disagreements over regulatory scope have emerged as a persistent obstacle to reaching consensus. Such divergence is displayed during the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) meeting in Busan in 2024. 110 developing countries advocated for the proposal of the “African Group”, while the majority of remaining members were more inclined to support the US proposal (IISD 2024:12). This reflects the differing positions on whether countries should ban harmful chemical products, with opponents voicing concerns over potential impacts on trade limitations and economic inequalities. This disagreement is amplified when Rwanda, on behalf of 85 countries, proclaimed the necessity to include a global requirement to reduce the production of plastic polymers (IISD 2024:4). Rwanda expressed its concerns regarding a “small group of countries” that aim to remove such a requirement (IISD 2024:7).
The heterogeneity of plastic production and consumption patterns deepens the divide for regulatory scope. The African group notes its negligible role in plastic pollution (IISD 2024:7). The Like-Minded group, including the US, China, India, Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation, were heavily dependent on petro-chemical production. China, the US, Saudi Arabia, and India account for 56% shares of the world’s plastic production (Zero Carbon Analytics 2025). China and Saudi Arabia alone dominate 70% of global subsidies for plastic feedstock (Zero Carbon Analytics 2025). These structural economic differences underline the difficulty of establishing a compromise to support the global plastic pollution treaty.
Lastly, disagreements about treaty designs have also become a source of deadlock. Debates have been centered around the treaty’s mandatory characteristics, on whether measures would meet criteria-based global requirements or be adjusted based on national circumstances (IISD 2024:4). In effect, establishing a design consensus for managing plastic products, reducing plastic waste, and addressing existing plastic pollution remains a structural obstacle that prevents effective agreement (IISD 2024:4-5).
The INC meeting in Busan remains a strong example to illustrate the deadlock. Rwanda, Mexico, and the EU, representing more than 100 countries, firmly advocate for top-down measures for the treaty (IISD 2024:7-8). The Like-Minded group, however, contested against the pursuit of enforceability and posited that such an approach would undermine the inclusivity needed for effective agreements (IISD 2024:8). Both INC-5 in Busan and INC-5.2 in Geneva adjourned without a consensus, with disagreement over scope and treaty design being the primary barriers (Willige 2025).
These obstacles underline that a singular approach is not possible for addressing the global plastic pollution problem. Trade-offs between ambition and participation become necessary to align the divergent interests of treaty members.
Indonesia is well-positioned to bridge these two opposing blocs. Aligned with its foreign policy doctrine, Indonesia operates under the principles of “independent and active”. It underlines the importance of a collective approach to addressing the plastic pollution problem, emphasizing inclusivity (IISD 2024:8).
Indonesia imports 100% of its naphtha, and is also heavily reliant on plastic imports from the Middle East, notably from the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Plastic has not only become an essential resource for its industries, but it also has a significant influence over Indonesian farmers through plastic mulch that helps to prevent water evaporation. The scarcity of plastic will have significant consequences on social and economic development in Indonesia. These import dependencies highlights Indonesia’s incentives to maintain plastic intake for sustaining domestic economic activities.
At the same time, it is heavily affected by marine flows of plastic pollution. Ever since the waste import ban in China in 2018, Indonesia has been experiencing a rising waste intake over the next few years, receiving imported waste from Japan, Australia, and EU nations (Lotulung and Riliananda 2025). The World Bank (2021) estimates that Indonesia produces about 7.8 million tons of plastic each year, with 4.9 million being mismanaged. An estimate of 83% of annual plastic waste leaks into the marine environment, while the rest is disposed in coastal areas. The economic cost of plastic leakage is estimated to be IDR 225 trillion or USD 13.7 billion annually (World Economic Forum 2025).
Consequently, Indonesia is both a major consumer and a victim of global plastic pollution. It sits at the intersection of competing interests: maintaining plastic production and supporting stronger international action for minimizing plastic pollution. Due to this unique position, Indonesia signals both the credibility and incentive to balance these two differing interests.
I argue that Indonesia should advocate for a bottom-up approach to ensure participation of the Like-Minded group, while facilitating the demands of the African group. Immediate norm-setting initiative should be a priority, for it builds momentum for more ambitious plans.
Reflecting the success of the Vienna Convention, a bottom-up approach enables participation to broaden while ambition progresses upwards. The Vienna Convention evolved into the Montreal Protocol, before eventually achieving universal ratification. This illustrates the effectiveness of bottom-up entry if combined with a credible escalation pathway (Multilateral Fund 2025).
Although the bottom-up approach sacrifices further ambition, I believe that it is a necessary trade-off to ensure broader participation. Indonesia must then position itself as a force for this initiative. It is well-positioned to build consensus between two opposing blocs while laying the foundations for stronger initiatives in the long run.
Textbook Reference
Howes S, Agarwal V, and Woolf M (2026) Growth, inequality, and the environment: an introduction, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU.